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The European Union fulfills its emissions reductions commitments by means of an emissions 
trading scheme covering some part of each member state’s economy and by national 
emissions control in the rest of their economies. The member states also levy 
energy/emissions taxes overlapping with the trading scheme. Restricting our focus on cost-
effective policies, this paper investigates the distributive consequences of increasing the 
overlapping emissions tax that is uniform across countries. For quasi-linear utility functions 
and for a class of parametric utility and production functions emissions tax increases turn out 
to be exactly offset by permit price reductions. As a consequence permit-exporting [permit-
importing] countries lose [gain] from an increase in the emissions tax. These results are not 
general, however. By means of a numerical example we show that export-import reversals 
and welfare reversals are possible. 
JEL Code: H21, H22, Q56. 
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In the Kyoto Protocol the EU committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 8%
in 2012 from its baseline emissions in 1990. In order to fulﬁll this commitment the EU
has established an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 2005 (see EU 2003a) allowing for
EU-wide trade in emissions permits. With respect to emissions control the economies of
all member states are split into two sectors. The installations covered by the ETS, referred
to as the ETS sector, include combustion installations, mineral oil reﬁneries, coke ovens,
installations producing and processing ferrous materials, mineral installations and industrial
plants for the production of pulp and paper. In the rest of the economy, called the non-ETS
sector (that mainly consists of private households and transportation), emissions control is
the national governments’ responsibility and is carried out through instruments other than
emissions trading. Another peculiarity of EU emissions control is the existence of emissions
or energy taxes in the ETS sectors overlapping with the ETS (Johnstone 2003, Sorrell and
Sijm 2003). Table 1 lists exemplarily selective overlapping energy taxes in ETS-sectors.1
Coal Heavy fuel oil for Light fuel oil
in industry combustion installations in industry
Austria 35.9 5.4 24.2
Finland 43.0 - 14.0
France - - 11.7
Germany - 10.1 13.0
Ireland - 7.0 8.9
Poland - 6.4 12.5
Spain - - 16.6
Sweden - - 12.8
Table 1: Percentage of energy taxes2 in prices in the second quarter 2007 (International Energy Agency
2007)
We aim at modeling a hybrid EU-type policy in a stylized way. Under the simplifying
assumption that in their non-ETS sectors national governments control emissions through
a sectoral emissions tax, box 2 in Table 2 shows the mix of complementary and overlapping
policy instruments that will be focused here. Box 1 in Table 2 represents the limiting case
1The ’Energy Tax Directive’ (EU 2003b) sets minimum tax levels on fossil fuel starting in 2004. It
allows for many exemptions and tax reductions, e.g. for energy-intensive business. Art. 14 stipulates that
Member States shall exempt from taxation energy products used to produce electricity but on the other
hand it allows Member States to subject these energy products to taxation without having to respect the
minimum levels of taxation laid down in the Directive. The eﬀect of the Directive is small because most
countries have higher rates than the minimums.
2VAT is not included in prices and taxes shown for industry and electricity generation because it is
refunded.
1in which no tax is levied in the ETS sector while box 3 can be interpreted as the state in
which the rate of the tax in the ETS sector is so high as to ’dry up’ the permit market.
Emissions control in the ETS sector via
ETS ETS and sectoral tax Sectoral tax
Emissions control in the
non-ETS sector via sectoral tax
1 2 3
Table 2: EU-type emissions control in a two-sector economy
To capture such policies in a multi-country model we translate the EU commitment
of emissions reductions into an upper bound, say ¯ c, for total emissions in the group of
countries. The EU burden sharing agreement (EU 1999) is then interpreted as a political
decision to split the overall emissions cap ¯ c into national caps, ci, one for each member
state i = 1,...,n, satisfying
P
j cj = ¯ c. Throughout the rest of this paper we will take the
partition (c1,...,cn) of the overall cap ¯ c as given. As noted above, the EU ETS covers only
part of each member state’s economy. Therefore, the national cap ci needs to be further
split into a cap for the ETS and the non-ETS sector. The cap for the non-ETS sector is
then implemented by a sectoral emissions tax whereas the cap of the ETS sector deﬁnes
the country’s budget of emissions permits to be issued by the national government and
allocated to the installations in its ETS sector.
Obviously, that hybrid policy is susceptible to many pitfalls of cost ineﬀectiveness,
in particular when overlapping taxes in the ETS sectors are included in the policy mix.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers studying international emissions
trading with overlapping emissions taxes. Böhringer et al. (2007) use a CGE model to
study the impact of overlapping regulation through a unilateral carbon tax in one of the
countries (Germany). They show that the German ETS sector carries excessive costs while
the other EU member states may beneﬁt or lose from that tax. Eichner and Pethig (2008)
use a general equilibrium model to assess policy (in)eﬀectiveness when national governments
have discretion in ﬁxing both an overlapping tax and their budget of emissions permits.
Eichner and Pethig (2008) establish that cost eﬀectiveness for the group of countries is
attained if and only if there is a tax in the ETS sector (possibly zero) that is uniform
across countries and a tax in the non-ETS sector that is also uniform across countries at a
rate equal to the sum of the permit price and the rate of the tax in the ETS sector. The
important message is that as long as the emissions tax in the ETS sectors is uniform across
countries it can be ﬁxed at diﬀerent levels without compromising cost eﬀectiveness for the
group of countries.
2In the present paper we will brieﬂy reconstruct the model developed in Eichner and
Pethig (2008), restate their cost-eﬀectiveness result, and base our subsequent analysis on
that model. However, we will exclusively consider cost-eﬀective policies disregarding (em-
pirically existing) cost ineﬀective policies and possible corrective actions that are addressed
by Böhringer et al. (2007) or Eichner and Pethig (2008). This restriction serves to direct
as clearly as possible the focus on the objective of the present paper, namely to study the
distributional consequences of variations in the overlapping emissions tax.
To our knowledge, this distributional issue has not been analyzed in a two-sector
general equilibrium framework which captures the EU emissions control in a stylized way.
We aim to determine the welfare eﬀects of variations in the overlapping emissions tax.
More speciﬁcally, denote by ui(c,ty) the welfare of country i in the (unique) competitive
equilibrium of the multi-country model which prevails when c = (c1,...,cn) is the vector of
national emissions caps and when ty is the rate of the emissions tax in the countries’ ETS
sectors.3 We are interested in the sign of the derivative ∂ui(c,ty)/∂ty whose calculation
turns out to be non-trivial because it requires carrying out a full-scale comparative static
analysis of the multi-country model.
Due to the model’s complexity we do not succeed in fully characterizing the distribu-
tional impact of variations in ty (from ty = 0 to some high level of ty for which the permit
price becomes zero). However, we do obtain clear-cut analytical answers for the special case
of quasi-linear utility as well as for a class of parametric utility and production functions.
In both cases we show that an increase in the tax rate ty is exactly oﬀset by a reduction
in the equilibrium permit price leaving all ﬁrms’ production unaﬀected. Yet the value of
imports and exports of permits is aﬀected, and it is shown that an individual country loses
wealth to the beneﬁt of all other countries, when it exports permits, and gains wealth at
the expense of all other countries, when it imports permits.
However, the perfect oﬀset of variations in the tax rate by changes in the equilibrium
permit price turns out to be a special case that is typical only in models where the market
of emissions permits is isolated from all other markets. In general, market-interdependence
eﬀects, i.e. repercussions of tax variations in markets other than the permit market, render
imperfect the oﬀset between the tax rate and the permit price. We show this by means of
a numerical example in which one of the countries that initially exports permits eventually
starts importing permits following successive increases in the tax rate ty. As a consequence
of that export-import reversal the country switches from welfare gains to losses. Therefore,
the central message of the paper can be summarized as follows: the distributional impact
3As we restrict our attention to cost-eﬀective policies it is necessary to assume the tax rate to be uniform
across countries.
3of variations in the emissions tax in the countries’ ETS sector is signiﬁcant, and since in the
real world market-interdependence eﬀects are not negligible, that impact is less clear-cut in
magnitude and direction than suggested by partial equilibrium analysis.
Those less clear-cut distributional consequences are speciﬁc, indeed, to the EU-type
emissions control as modeled here. To demonstrate that more clearly, we modify our stan-
dard model of two-sector economies with a joint ETS by brieﬂy considering a model of
two-sector economies with separate national ETSs and, alternatively a model of one-sector
economies with a joint ETS. In both cases market-interdependence eﬀects turn out to be
absent implying that the pertaining allocation and distribution is as in our standard model
with quasi-linear preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and characterizes the
cost-eﬀective allocation which is then decentralized in competitive markets by appropriate
emissions control. Section 3 presents the incidence of increasing the uniform overlapping
emissions tax in the ETS sector. In Section 4 we analyze modiﬁed versions of our standard
model and Section 5 concludes.
2 Cost-eﬀective EU-style carbon emissions control
2.1 The model
Consider a group of n countries embedded in the world economy. The economy of each
country i (i = 1,...,n) consists of two sectors Xi and Y i producing two consumption goods
xsi and ysi with the help of fossil fuel, exi and eyi, by means of the production functions4
xsi = X
i (exi) and ysi = Y
i (eyi) (1)
that are increasing and strictly concave. The representative consumer of country i derives




that is increasing in both arguments. Good X is nontradable, and hence domestic con-
sumption is required to match domestic production
xi = xsi. (3)
4Upper case letters denote functions and subscripts attached to them indicate partial derivatives.
4Good Y and fossil fuel are traded on world markets at constant prices py and pe, respectively.
All fuel input is assumed to be imported from the rest of the world.
Since CO2 emissions are proportional to the input of fossil fuel, we simply denote both
by the same symbols. Modeling the EU’s commitment in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions by 8 percent from 1990 to 2012 we assume that the group of
countries as a whole restricts its total emissions to some level5 ¯ c > 0. To meet that target
each country is assigned a national emissions cap ci ≥ 0 like in the EU burden-sharing
agreement such that
P
j cj = ¯ c. In each country the national emissions cap needs to be
split up into two sectoral caps cyi and cxi satisfying
ci = cxi + cyi. (4)
The sectoral caps are assumed to restrain emissions in the following way6







2.2 The cost-eﬀective allocation
Consider now a social planner aiming to maximize the weighted sum of the utilities of all




[py(ysj − yj) − pe(exj + eyj)] = 0 (7)



















{py[Y (eyj) − yj] − pe(exj + eyj)} + λe
X
j
(cyj − eyj), (8)













e = pe + µe for i = 1,...,n, (10)
5Throughout the paper we take ¯ c to be smaller than total business-as-usual emissions
P
j (exj + eyj).




j exj. The rationale of the diﬀerential treatment of the sectors X and Y is to model in the next section
the institutional setting of the EU where the ETS covers the sectors Y of all member states only while each
member state is obliged to implement the cap cxi in its sector X.
5where µxi := λxi/λh and µe := λe/λh, and where λe, λh. The cost-eﬀective allocation
requires consumption eﬃciency (9) by equalizing the marginal rates of substitution and
the price ratios across countries, and production eﬃciency (10) by equalizing marginal
abatement costs across sectors and countries.
2.3 Cost-eﬀectiveness in the competitive economy
Having characterized in Proposition 1 the cost-eﬀective allocation as a benchmark, we
now introduce into the model (1)-(7) competitive markets for good X with price pxi in
all countries i = 1,...,n along with the following emissions control policies: There is an
emissions tax on good Y at rate tyi, an emissions tax on good X at rate txi and the group
as a whole operates an emissions trading scheme (ETS) with mandatory participation of
all countries’ sectors Y . Henceforth we will refer to sector Y as the ETS sector and to
sector X as the non-ETS sector. To install the ETS, each country i issues the amount
cyi of marketable emissions permits and allocates them to the ﬁrms in its ETS sector. A
competitive market for permits will arise with the aggregate supply being ﬁxed at
P
j cyj
and with the aggregate demand
P
j eyj being determined by the permit price πe as to meet
the market-clearing condition (6).
In this institutional setting the proﬁts of the aggregate sectoral ﬁrms are7
pxiX
i (exi) − (txi + pe)exi and pyY
i (eyi) − πe(eyi − cyi) − (tyi + pe)eyi,
and the associated ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization read
pxiX
i
e (exi) = txi + pe and pyY
i
e (eyi) = tyi + pe + πe. (11)
The consumer of country i maximizes her utility Ui (xi,yi) subject to her budget constraint
zi = pxixi + pyyi, (12)
where zi := g∗
xi +g∗
yi +txiexi +tyieyi is her income consisting of the ﬁrm’s maximum proﬁts,
g∗
xi and g∗
yi, and the tax revenues, txiexi + tyieyi, recycled to the consumer in a lumpsum




7The way proﬁts are deﬁned for the ETS sector implies gratis allocation of permits to that sector. Due
to the high level of abstraction of the model under consideration, allocating permits via auction would leave
the results unchanged.
6Proposition 1. (Eichner and Pethig 2008)8
The equilibrium allocation of the competitive economy (1)-(6) and (11)-(13) is costeﬀective,
if and only if
txi = tx and tyi = ty for all i = 1,...,n (14)
and
tx = πe + ty. (15)
The important message of Proposition 1 is that a cost-eﬀective allocation can be attained
by means of a policy mix consisting of an ETS and of emissions taxes satisfying (14) and
(15). There is a ’degree of freedom’ concerning the level of the (uniform) tax rate ty because
for the ﬁrms in the ETS sector it is the total price of energy input and emissions, pe+πe+ty,
that matters. The ﬁrms’ demand for energy and emissions permits depends on that total
price irrespective of what its components are.
Casual evidence of carbon emissions control in the EU suggests that none of the three
equalities in (14) and (15) are satisﬁed. There are positive non-uniform tax rates tyi in
various member states as shown in Table 1. Yet the rates tyi tend to be low relative to the
(implicit) tax rates txi and the average permit price πe was also very low during the ﬁrst
trading phase 2005-2007 suggesting that txi > πe + tyi for many EU member states during
the last years.
Although Proposition 1 provides straightforward guidelines for improving the cost-
eﬀectiveness of carbon emissions control in the EU, we will not elaborate on that issue
but focus, instead, on the distributional impacts of the hybrid EU-style policy mix. To
avoid coping with distributional consequences of cost-ineﬀective allocations we will restrict
our attention to cost-eﬀective policies. In other words, (14) and (15) are assumed to hold
throughout the rest of the paper. It follows that for ﬁxed national emissions caps, ci, the tax
rate ty (with tyi = ty all i) is the sole autonomous policy instrument. In practice, employing
a uniform tax rate ty presupposes an internationally coordinated tax policy or alternatively,
a supranational ﬁscal authority ﬁxing the tax rate ty and requiring all governments to set
the tax rate tx in their non-ETS sectors as to satisfy (15). We will make use of the latter
interpretation and refer to the supranational ﬁscal authority as the center.
Observing the cost-eﬀective conditions (14) and (15), the center has some discretion
in ﬁxing the tax rate ty. In fact, there is a range of tax rates ty supporting cost-eﬀective
competitive equilibria with the following polar cases:
8See also the stylized analysis of overlapping regulation in Böhringer et al. (2008).
7(i) Suppose the center ﬁxes the tax rate at ty = 0 (box 1 in Table 2). The cost-eﬀective
emissions control then consists of a tax-and-cap policy in each country’s domestic
non-ETS sector and an international ETS covering the ETS sectors of all countries.
Although in this case no overlapping regulation is employed both instruments are still
linked through the cost-eﬀectiveness condition tx = πe.
(ii) Suppose the center ﬁxes the rate at some high level, say ¯ ty > 0, such that in the
resultant equilibrium total demand for permits equals total supply at price πe = 0
(box 3 in Table 2). The cost-eﬀectiveness condition then is tx = ¯ ty. A strange feature
of this scenario is that in spite of πe = 0 the market for emissions permits is still in
operation. This polar case will play a benchmark role in the subsequent analysis.
It follows that associated to each ty ∈ [0,¯ ty] there is a cost-eﬀective competitive
equilibrium (box 2 in Table 2). However, we do not yet know how these equilibria diﬀer
with respect to the distribution of the countries’ income and welfare. Our goal is to explore
the distributive impacts of variations in ty. These eﬀects will be investigated by means
of a comparative static analysis of our multi-country model in the next section. To ease
the exposition, we will omit some of the tedious calculations referring the reader to the
full-scale comparative statics in the Appendix.
3 Incidence of the uniform emissions tax overlapping
with the ETS
3.1 Comparative statics using general functional forms
In this section we start from an initial competitive equilibrium for some vector c = (c1,...,cn)
of national emissions caps and for some ty ∈ [0,¯ ty]. We will leave the national emissions cap
unchanged but will disturb the initial equilibrium by a small (exogenous) variation in ty and
determine the displacement eﬀects characterizing the new cost-eﬀective equilibrium reached
after the shock. Ultimately, we are interested in the associated redistribution of national
welfare as measured by changes in the utility of the countries’ representative consumers


































> 0, δi := αi − βityDi
z, γi := αiXi
e −
Di
p − (xi + αity)Di
z. In addition, λi > 0 is the marginal welfare of income in country i and
9For convenience of notation good Y is chosen as numeraire (py ≡ 1).
8∆eyi := ci −exi −eyi is the amount of permits exported (∆eyi > 0) or imported (∆eyi < 0)
by country i. Although it can be shown (Appendix A) that αiδi > βiγi and that γi > 0
under weak restrictions, (16) only yields limited information on the sign of dui/dty. We are
able to infer from (16) that sign
dui
dty = −sign∆eyi, if ty = 0 and dπe/dty < 0, and that
dui
dty






z/zi is suﬃciently small (see Appendix A). Yet in general, the sign of
dui/dty is ambiguous for permit-exporting countries as well as for permit-importing coun-
tries. It crucially depends on the sign and magnitude of dπe/dty the speciﬁcation of which
requires to explore how the permit market responds to variations in the tax rate ty. Since
the permit market is at the core of the EU-style emissions control we will investigate the
determinants of dπe/dty in more detail.
Observe ﬁrst that in the initial equilibrium the equations (6) and (11) hold so that












where qe := pe + πe + ty, and where Exi ( ) and Eyi ( ) are sectoral demand functions for
energy and permits implicitly contained in (11). If in (17) the prices px1,...,pxn clear the
national markets for good X, equation (17) determines the equilibrium permit price, πe,
































According to (18) changes in the tax rate ty are exactly oﬀset by opposite changes
in the permit price πe unless
P
j [αj(dpxj/dty)]  = 0. This term is clearly zero in partial
equilibrium models where Y is the only consumer good. However, in market economies with
more than one consumer good, the interdependence eﬀects dpxi/dty will lead to dπe/dty  =






























9Not surprisingly, (20) allows for deviations of dπe/dty from −1 in either direction as does
(18). However, closer inspection of (20) shows that progress can be made in the special
case of utility functions taking on the functional form Ui (xi,yi) = V i(xi)+yi with V i being
increasing and strictly concave in xi. For that class of so-called quasi-linear utility functions
the income eﬀect of the demand for good X is known to be zero (Di
z ≡ 0) such that (20)
turns into dπe/dty = −1.
Proposition 2.
If the utility functions Ui from (2) are quasi-linear the incidence of the emissions tax is
given by Table 3.
dπe dpxi deyi dexi d∆eyi dxi dyi dzi dui
dty,∆eyi > 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 − − −
dty,∆eyi < 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 + + +
Table 3: Tax incidence in the general model in case of quasi-linear utility functions
It is easy to see that with Di
z = 0 (all i) the ETS and the overlapping (uniform) emissions
tax are perfect substitutes in the sense that the total factor price, qe = pe + πe + ty,
is unaﬀected by variations in ty. Since Di
z = 0 and since dπe/dty eliminates spillovers
between the permit market and the national markets for good X, the demand for permit
remains unchanged in all sectors and hence the permit market is unaﬀected. However, the
distributional incidence of tax shifts is pronounced: An increase in the tax rate ty beneﬁts
permit-importing countries but reduces the welfare of permit-exporting countries. Since
dexi = deyi = 0, d(∆eyi)/dtyi = 0 follows, i.e. a country’s permit exports or imports do
not depend on the level of ty.
Zero income elasticity of demand for good X appears to be a restrictive and unrealistic
assumption. As pointed out above it eliminates market-interdependence eﬀects and thus
"isolates" the permit market which can then be studied as in a partial equilibrium model.
To gain further insights in the tax incidence without assuming zero income eﬀects we will
resort to parametric functional forms of the Cobb-Douglas type.
3.2 Comparative statics using parametric functional forms













10With (21) the impact of variations in the tax rate ty on the permit price, πe, can be shown















exi[(pe+πe)ai+¯ hiqe] > 0, ¯ hi :=
(1−hi)











(pe+πe)ai+¯ hiqe > 0. According to (22), dpx/dty  = 0 is non-zero in general, and this
is true even in case of dπe/dty = −1.10 More speciﬁcally, for dπe/dty = −1 it follows from
(22) that dpxi/dty > 0 for permit-importing countries and dpxi/dty < 0 for permit-exporting
countries. If dπe/dty  = −1, dpxi/dty may be positive or negative.
Inserting (22) into (18) does not render the result more informative. However, taking














(1−bi)ai > 0. As in the model of Section 3.1, the change in the countries’
welfare, dui/dty, is given by (16). dui/dty remains ambiguous in sign although γi is now
unequivocally positive. However, closer inspection of (23) reveals that dπe/dty = −1, if
ai = a and hi = h for alli. (24)
Note that with (24) countries may still diﬀer with respect to their production functions for
good Y (bi  = bj) and their national caps (ci  = cj) such that net exports and imports of
permits will be non-zero, in general.
A remarkable consequence of the assumption (24) is that in contrast to the special
case Di
z = 0, all i, of Section 3.1 variations in ty do aﬀect the market for good X: Combining
(22) and (24) shows that a tax hike dty > 0 will raise [lower] the equilibrium price pxi if
country i imports [exports] permits. Moreover, we know from comparing (18) and (23) that
if (24) holds the opposite price changes of permit exporting and importing countries are
symmetric in the sense that
P
j [αj(dpxj/dty)] = 0.
Since qe remains unchanged, the demand for energy inputs of the ETS sectors does
not change either. On the other hand, the increase [reduction] in the price pxi induced by
dty > 0 reduces [increases] the demand for energy inputs in the non-ETS sector of permit







10Recall that in the previous section Di
z = 0 for all i implied dπe/dty = −1 as well as dpxi/dty = 0.
Note also that with the Cobb-Douglas utility function the income eﬀect on the demand for both goods is
positive.
11we conclude that the subsets of permit-exporting and importing countries are independent
of the level of ty. The comparative statics carried out in Appendix B yield
Proposition 3.
If the functions Xi, Y i and Ui from (1) and (2) are speciﬁed by (21) and if (24) holds, the
incidence of the emissions tax is given by Table 4.
dπe dpxi deyi dexi d∆eyi dxi dyi dzi dui
dty,∆eyi > 0 −1 − 0 − + − − − −
dty,∆eyi < 0 −1 + 0 + − + + + +
Table 4: Tax incidence in the parametric model, when technologies of good X and
preferences are the same across countries
Comparing Table 4 with Table 3 reveals that in both cases we observe dπe/dty = −1 and
the qualitative changes in deyi, dyi, dzi and dui are the same. However, while in case of
Di
z ≡ 0 (Table 3) both endogenous markets, i.e. the market for good X and the permit
market, remain unaﬀected, the parametric model satisfying (24) exhibits repercussions in
both markets. As an implication, the cost-eﬀective split of the national emissions caps into
two sectoral caps depends on the level of the tax rate ty in the parametric model satisfying
(24) while it is unaﬀected by ty in case of Di
z = 0.
Apart from these diﬀerences, the restrictions imposed on the model in Propositions
2 and 3 have an important property in common: They imply that the derivatives of
all endogenous variables with respect to ty are either zero or unconditionally positive
or negative. In other words, there are functions v = v(ty) for all endogenous variables
v = πe,pxi,exi,eyi,∆eyi,xi,yi,zi,ui which are monotone or strictly monotone in the tax
rate ty. For that reason the comparative statics analysis does not only yield ’local infor-
mation’ for marginal variations in the tax rate but provides ’global information’ about the
properties of the functions v = v(ty). The most relevant properties are highlighted in
Proposition 4.
Denote by ∆eyi(ty) and ui(ty) country i’s permit trade balance and welfare, respectively,
when the center has ﬁxed the tax rate at ty ∈ [0,¯ ty] and suppose the functional forms are as
speciﬁed in Proposition 2 or Proposition 3.
(a) If country i exports [imports] permits for some ty ∈ [0,¯ ty], it exports [imports] permits
for all ty ∈ [0,¯ ty].
(b) Permit-exporting [permit-importing] countries lose [gain] whenever the tax rate ty is
12raised such that
ui(0) > ui(¯ ty), if ∆eyi > 0 and ui(0) < ui(¯ ty), if ∆eyi < 0. (25)
We conclude that under the conditions of Proposition 4 the distributional consequences of
variations in the tax rate ty are unambiguous. Unfortunately this feature does not hold in
general, i.e. if Di
z  = 0 or if (24) does not hold, we cannot draw conclusions from marginal
information provided by the comparative-static analysis on the global properties of the
functions v(ty). In the next Section we will therefore resort to numerical analysis of our
parametric model aiming at global information on the functions v(ty) when (24) is not
satisﬁed. Particular attention will be placed on whether and how dπe/dty deviates from
minus one, whether non-marginal variations of ty may lead to export-import reversals and
what the associated changes in the distribution of national welfare are.
3.3 Non-monotone changes in welfare: a numerical example
In this section we consider a parametric model of Section 3.2 for which condition (24) is
not satisﬁed. To make progress we consider a three-country model in which the parameters
take on the values a1 = 0.2, a2 = 0.6, a3 = 0.9, b1 = b2 = b3 = 0.5, c1 = 0.605, c2 = 0.6,
c3 = 1.3, h1 = h2 = h3 = 0.5, pe = 0.2. For this model we then compute the equilibrium
allocation as a function of the tax rate ty with the help of the tool Mathematica (Appendix
C) establishing
Proposition 5.
If in the parametric model of Section 3.2 the tax rate ty is successively raised, some permit-
exporting country may eventually import permits such that its national income and welfare
ﬁrst decline but then increase.
The qualitative properties of the response of the entire equilibrium allocation to successive
increases in the tax rate are summarized in Table 5, and the Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide
additional illustration of some of the particularly interesting functions.
πe(ty) pxi(ty) eyi(ty) exi(ty) ∆eyi(ty) xi(ty) yi(ty) zi(ty) ui(ty)
country 1 U-SH DECR











∆ey3 > 0 CONC CONC CONV CONC
DECR & CONV
13(DECR= monotone decreasing, U-SH= u-shaped, INCR= monotone increasing, CONV=
strictly convex, CONC= strictly concave)
Table 5: Equilibrium quantities and prices as functions of the
tax rate ty: numerical example





















Figure 1: Exports and imports of permits





















Figure 2: National incomes



















Figure 3: National welfare
A few comments on the results are in order. Although the graph of the function πe(ty)
(see Appendix C) is clearly negatively sloped it exhibits little curvature, if any. Nonetheless



















14Country 2 imports and country 3 exports permits, and as in the model of Table 4 the levels
of imports and exports rise with increasing tax rate (Figure 2). Corresponding to these
changes the national income and the welfare in country 2 increase with the tax rate while
national income and welfare shrink in country 3 (Figures 2 and 3).
The striking feature of the numerical example under consideration highlighted in
Proposition 5 are the eﬀects of successive tax increases on the allocation in country 1. As
shown in the left panel of Figure 1 country 1 ﬁrst exports permits but becomes an importer
of permits when the tax continues to increase.11 Along with that reversal from exports to
imports the price of good X, the national income and national welfare of country 1 are
u-shaped functions of the tax rate (left panels of Figures 2 and 3). The observation that
export-import reversals are feasible and with them non-monotone welfare changes makes
it diﬃcult to assess correctly the impact of tax hikes on the international distribution of
welfare.
4 Emissions tax incidence in simpliﬁed models
It is clearly the EU-type emissions control as modeled above that is crucial for our result that
national welfare may be non-monotone in the tax rate ty (Proposition 5). To further clarify
and reinforce that observation we will show in the sequel that non-monotone welfare changes
do not occur in modiﬁed versions of our standard model in which either the international
ETS is replaced by disjoined national ETSs or in which all national economies consist of
one sector only. In Section 4.1 we investigate two-sector economies with domestic ETS and
in Section 4.2 we turn to one-sector economies with international ETS.
4.1 Two-sector economies with domestic ETSs
We now assume that the group of countries does not achieve its emissions target
P
j cyi
through an international ETS but that in each country a domestic ETS is in operation such
that the emissions in country i’s sector Y are restrained by
cyi = eyi. (26)
11The same qualitative result is obtained by Böhringer et al. (2007) in their CGE approach for the case
that an overlapping tax is unilaterally levied by one of the EU member states. However, that policy not
only places an excess cost on the country levying an overlapping tax but it also is cost-ineﬀective from the
point of view of the group of countries. In the present paper we focus on variations in an overlapping tax
that is uniform across countries and hence does compromise cost-eﬀectiveness.
15The two-sector model with domestic ETS is speciﬁed by (1) - (5) and (26), and the country’s
trade balance is given by
py(ysj − yj) − pe(exj + eyj) = 0 (27)
Proﬁt maximization implies (11) and the consumer’s budget and demand function are
given by (12) and (13), respectively. Without loss of generality we restrict our attention to
a representative country and suppress the index i. Then the cost-eﬀective allocation follows
from solving the Lagrangian
L = U(x,y) + λx[X(ex) − x] + λc(c − cy − ex)
+ λh{py[Y (ey) − y] − pe(ex + ey)} + λe(cy − ey). (28)
It is straightforward to show that the competitive equilibrium of an individual two-sector
economy with domestic ETS is cost-eﬀective if and only if tx = µe, ty ∈ [0,µe] and πe =
µe−ty, where µe := λe/λh. As in the previous section cost-eﬀectiveness can be achieved by
levying an emissions tax in sector X in combination either with an emissions tax in sector
Y , or with a pure domestic ETS, or with intermediate policies combining positive tax rates
ty > 0 with an ETS.12
The comparative statics in Appendix D of parametric changes in ty reveal
Proposition 6. Consider a group of countries each of which consists of a two-sector
economy and operates a domestic ETS. For such country it is true that
(i) an increase in the emissions tax rate ty is exactly oﬀset by a reduction in the equilibrium
permit price (dπe = −dty);
(ii) the cost-eﬀective allocation and the country’s welfare are unaﬀected by small variations
in the emissions tax rate ty.
Proposition 6 highlights the distributional irrelevance of variations in ty in the simple econ-
omy under consideration. Because the emissions controls of the countries are independent,
neither the ETS-only policy nor the tax-only policy nor any policy mix has allocative or
distributional displacement eﬀects.
12Note that tax rates will tend to diﬀer across countries in the model under consideration because the
countries’ emissions controls are no longer interdependent. As a consequence, the overall cap ¯ c =
P
j cj
is not implemented in a cost-eﬀective way, in general, although each country’s emissions control is cost-
eﬀective from the country’s domestic perspective.
164.2 One-sector economies with international ETS
In this subsection we deviate from our standard model by assuming that the economy of
country i consists only of a single sector, sector Y . Carrying over the notation from the














[py(ysj − yj) − peeyj] = 0, (32)
pyY
i
e = πe + tyi + pe, (33)
zi = pyyi. (34)
(29) and (30) specify the production and utility function, respectively. The market for
emissions clears according to (31). (32) is the group’s consolidated trade balance, (33) is
the aggregate ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization and (34) is the consumer’s
budget constraint.
Determining the cost-eﬀective allocation and decentralizing it in a competitive econ-
omy we obtain a special case of Proposition 1 where txi = 0 for all i, which is obvious since
we eliminated sector X. In a group of countries with international ETS a precondition for
cost-eﬀectiveness is an emissions tax ty being uniform across countries. Again we get an
equivalence regarding cost-eﬀectiveness of the ETS-only policy, the tax-only policy and all
”convex combinations”. However, unlike in the model of the previous section, variations
in the tax rate now do have allocative and distributional eﬀects. To obtain more speciﬁc
qualitative information on those eﬀects, we investigate the impacts of parametric changes
in ty on cost-eﬀective competitive equilibria in comparative static analysis (Appendix D).
The results are summarized in
Proposition 7. Consider a group of countries each of which consists of a one-sector
economy and all countries operate a joint ETS. The incidence of small variations in the
uniform emissions tax is given by
dπe deyi d∆eyi dyi dzi dui
dty,∆eyi > 0 −1 0 0 − − −
dty,∆eyi < 0 −1 0 0 + + +
Table 6: Tax incidence in one-sector economies; ∆eyi := ci − eyi
17From Proposition 7 we infer that an increase in the tax rate ty is exactly oﬀset by a reduction
in the permit price (dπe/dty = −1) thus leaving the ﬁrms’ production and input decisions
unaﬀected (dysi/dty = deyi/dty = 0). Therefore the change in the consumer’s income is
given by
dzi = dyi = ∆eyidπe, (35)
where ∆eyi := ci−eyi is the amount of permits exported (∆eyi > 0) or imported (∆eyi < 0)
by country i. According to (35) increasing ty reduces the permit-exporting country’s income.
As an immediate consequence, the consumption of good Y declines and with it the country’s
welfare. All these eﬀects are reversed in permit-importing countries.
To sum up, allocative and distributional eﬀects vanish altogether if economies have
two sectors but ETS is domestic. Furthermore, one-sector economies with international
ETS exhibit the same allocative and distributional eﬀects as two-sector economies with
international ETS and quasi-linear utility functions. It follows that a necessary condition
for non-monotone welfare changes is an EU-type emissions control in the sense that an
international ETS is established in a group of countries such that only some part of all
countries’ economies is covered by the ETS.
5 Concluding remarks
In a stylized way, our paper addresses distributional consequences of a hybrid regime of CO2
emissions control designed to capture the basic features of the regime applied in the EU
since 2005. Characteristic of the EU regime is an EU-wide international ETS that coexists
with national complementary and overlapping national emissions taxes. Restricting our
attention to cost-eﬀective competitive equilibria we show that an increase in the rate of the
emissions tax levied in the ETS sector is exactly oﬀset by a reduction in the equilibrium
permit price in the case of quasi-linear utility functions and for a class of parametric utility
and production functions. Since the reduction in the permit price lowers [raises] a permit-
exporting [importing] country’s income, permit-exporting [importing] countries lose [gain]
from an increase in the emissions tax. However, these results are not general, because
emissions tax changes may cause ramiﬁcations beyond the permit market. With the help
of a numerical example we show that an initially permit-exporting country may switch to
import permits when the emissions tax is successively increased. Hence, export-import
reversals are feasible such that initially welfare-losing countries may turn to welfare-gaining
countries and vice versa.
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19Appendix A: Comparative statics of the general model
The cost-eﬀective competitive equilibrium of the multi-country economy is completely de-






(exj + eyj), (A1)
xsi = xi, i = 1,...,n, (A2)
xsi = X
i(exi), i = 1,...,n, (A3)
xi = D
i(pxi,zi), i = 1,...,n, (A4)
zi = pxixis + yis − pe(exi + eyi) + πe(ci − exi − eyi), i = 1,...,n (A5)
ysi = Y
i(eyi), i = 1,...,n, (A6)
zi = pxixi + yi, i = 1,...,n, (A7)
pxiX
i
e(exi) = pe + tx, i = 1,...,n, (A8)
Y
i
e = pe + πe + ty, i = 1,...,n, (A9)
tx = πe + ty, (A10)
where without loss of generality good Y is chosen as numeraire (py ≡ 1). The variables
determined by (A1) - (A10) are exi,eyi,xsi,xi,pxi,zi,ysi,yi for i = 1,...,n, πe and tx. The
tax rate ty is treated here as an exogenous parameter. It is convenient to compress the




















e(eyi) = pe + πe + ty, (A15)
yi = Y
i(eyi) − pe(exi + eyi) + πe∆eyi, (A16)
where ∆eyi := ci − exi − eyi in (A13) is the amount of permits exported or imported by
country i. The equations (A11) - (A15) serve to determine πe and exi,eyi,pxi and zi for
i = 1,...,n. Equation (A16) represents the current account balances, and it determines
yi after exi,eyi and πe are solved via (A11) - (A15). Our aim is to perform a comparative
static analysis to specify the impact on the economy of exogenous variations in the uniform













zdzi = 0, (A18)







eedeyi = 0 (A20)
Y
i
eedeyi − dπe − dty = 0 (A21)
To obtain (A19) we have diﬀerentiated (A13),




edeyi − pe(dexi + deyi) + ∆eyidπe − πe(dexi + deyi),
and then made use of (A14) and (A15).
Next we consider deyi = 1
Y i











Summation of dexi from (A22) and deyi from (A21) yields
dexi + deyi = αidpxi − βi(dπe + dty), (A23)

















− dπe = dty. (A24)
We take advantage of (A23) to turn (A19) into
dzi = (xi + αity)dpxi − βity(dπe + dty) + ∆eyidπe. (A25)









where δi := αi − βityDi
z and γi := αiXi
e − Di
p − (xi + αity)Di
z.









































py = λi to obtain
dui
λi
= pxidxi + dyi, (A29)
where λi is the marginal utility of income (i.e. the Lagrange multiplier assigned to the




pe + πe + ty
pxi
dexi. (A30)
From (A16) we obtain with the help of (A15)
dyi = tydeyi − (pe + πe)dexi + ∆eyidπe. (A31)
Inserting (A30) and (A31) in (A29) gives
dui
λi


























































































































































































































Lemma 2. The term αiδi − βiγi is negative.
Proof. Observe that































Making use of the deﬁnitions of βi and the elasticities ηi
xp and ηi
xz, and making use of the
Slutzky equation we obtain





























Comparative statics for quasi-linear utility functions (Table 3)
While dπe and dui follows from setting Di
z = 0 in (20) and (16), dpxi, deyi, dexi, dxi, dyi,
dzi follows from (A26), deyi =
dπe+dty
Y i
ee , (A22), (A30), (A31) and (A25), respectively.
23Appendix B: Comparative statics of the parametric model




i , Xi(exi) = e
ai
xi, Y i(eyi) = e
bi
yi the






















yi = qe, (B4)
bie
bi−1
yi = qe, (B5)
yi = e
bi
yi − (qe − ty)(exi + eyi) + πeci, (B6)
where qe := pe + πe + ty. Note that (B2), (B3) and (B6) imply
yi = (1 − hi)zi. (B7)




















We make use of (B8)-(B10) in (B3) to get
￿










eyi − πeci = 0. (B11)
Total diﬀerentiation of (B1), (B5), (B6) and (B11) yields
X
j
























































where ¯ hi :=
1−hi
hi and ρi :=
ai
¯ hiqe+ai(pe+πe) > 0. Inserting deyi from (B13) in (B16) yields
after some rearrangement of terms
dexi
ρi








In view of (B13) and (B17), the sum of dexi and deyi is equal to






























(dπe + dty), (B20)




∆eyidπe + µi(dπe + dty), (B21)







. dxi, dyi, dzi and dui have been calculated in
(A30), (A31), (B14) and (A33). We make use of (B13), (B17) and (B18) to transform















































= −tyσiρi(dπe + dty) + (tyρi + 1)∆eyidπe. (B25)
The signs in Table 4 follow from setting dπe = −dty in (B13), (B17), (B21)-(B25).
25Appendix C: Numerical example
In this Appendix C we show how we solved the equilibrium equation system in order
to simulate the graphs. Recall that for the special functional forms the multi-country
equilibrium is determined by (B1)-(B6). In the following, we transform the equations (B1)-













yi − (qe − ty)(exi + eyi) + πeci. (C1)















yi − (qe − ty)eyi + πeci
⇐⇒ exi + eyi =
e
bi
yi − (qe − ty)eyi + πeci
qe
(1−σi)







aiσi eyi + πe.ci
qe
(1−σi)
aiσi + (qe − ty)
. (C2)
The equations (B1), (B5) and (C2) now determine the equilibrium values of exi,eyi for all






from (B5) in (C2) which yields

















aiσi + (qe − ty)
, (C3)






















Equation (C4) implicitly determines πe as a function of ty, formally πe = πe(ty). Then
we can compute eyi(ty) from (B5), exi(ty) from (B4), ∆eyi(ty) from (C3) , xi(ty) from





The missing graphs of the numerical example are presented in the Figures 4-8.














ey1 = ey2 = ey3
Figure 4: The permit price, the emissions in sector Y

























Figure 5: The emissions in sector X



















Figure 6: The domestic price of good X
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
ty = 0 πe = 0 ty = 0 πe = 0 ty = 0 πe = 0
¯ ty ¯ ty ¯ ty
pxi 0.811 0.811 0.590 0.771 0.149 0.970
exi 0.149 0.150 0.334 0.409 0.664 0.572
eyi 0.452 0.458 0.452 0.458 0.452 0.458
∆eyi 0.003 -0.003 -0.186 -0.267 0.318 0.270
xi 0.683 0.684 0.518 0.585 0.692 0.605
yi 0.554 0.555 0.414 0.504 0.549 0.470
zi 1.108 1.110 0.828 1.009 1.097 0.939
ui 0.615 0.533 1.097 0.543 0.616 0.811
Table 6: Numerical values for ty = 0, πe = 0






















Figure 7: The consumption of good X























Figure 8: The consumption of good Y
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
The cost-eﬀective competitive equilibrium of the two-sector economy with domestic ETS is
described by ci = exi + eyi and (A2) - (A10). This equation system can be compressed to
ci = exi + eyi and (A12) - (A16). Total diﬀerentiation yields







zdzi = 0, (D2)







eedeyi = 0, (D4)
Y
i
eedeyi − dπe − dty = 0. (D5)





ee + Y i
ee
dpxi. (D6)


















e , (D6) and (D7) are satisﬁed if and only if dexi =
dpxi = 0. With that observation we infer deyi = dzi = 0 and dπe = −dty.
28Appendix E: Comparative statics of one-sector economies
For given prices pe and py and for given emissions tax rate ty the cost-eﬀective competitive







zi = pyysi + πe∆ei − peeyi, i = 1,...,n, (E2)
ysi = Y
i(eyi), i = 1,...,n, (E3)
zi = pyyi, i = 1,...,n, (E4)
Y
i
e = pe + πe + ty, i = 1,...,n, (E5)
where ∆eyi := cyi − eyi is the amount of permits exported or imported by country i. In
the following we carry out a comparative static analysis to specify the impact of exogenous
variations in the uniform tax rate ty. Without loss of generality we set py ≡ 1. Total









dzi = dyi, (E9)
Y
i
eedeyi = dπe + dty. (E10)
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